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IN SUPPORT OF THE PROPOSED MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
ROBERT B. McKAY t
I. INTRODUCTION
C ONCEPTS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY depend
upon and develop out of concepts of personal morality. So
I begin with the familiar words of Polonius in his advice to
Laertes:
This above all to thine own self be true,
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man.1
The ethical needs of the legal profession, while similar in
some respects to everyday moral considerations, are also somewhat
different. The lawyer is asked to submerge personal considerations
to the interests of the client and, in the words of Queen Caroline's
lawyer, "to know no other," even if the kingdom should fall.
2
Significantly, however, the lawyer is not asked - and must not
be asked - to be other than true to self, or to be false to any other.
That is, no code that calls itself ethical can demand that the lawyer
commit perjury or encourage perjury by a client or by any third
person. In dealing with client loyalty and confidentiality questions,
then, sharp distinctions must be drawn between defense of past
misconduct, condonation of future misconduct, and the giving of
advice that might facilitate future wrongdoing.
No one, I believe, disagrees with these propositions, but it is
not easy to articulate these basic truths as they apply to practical
issues involving clients, lawyers, and the public. As a result, lawyers
are misunderstood, maligned, and charged with being "hired guns"
in the pursuit of wrongdoing.3
t Director, The Institute of Judicial Administration, New York, N.Y.;
Senior Fellow, Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies; Member, ABA Com-
mission on Evaluation of Professional Standards. B.S., University of Kansas,
1940; J.D., Yale University, 1947.
1. W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, Act I, scene iii.
2. For a description of the circumstances surrounding Lord Brougham's
statement in Queen Caroline's case, see J. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 50-51
(1978).
3. See J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 2, at 136-75; Frankel, The Search for
Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1975); Thurman, Limits
to the Adversary System: Interests That Outweigh Confidentiality, 5 J. or THE
(1137)
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Manifestly, some unscrupulous lawyers have taken refuge in:
the ambiguities of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code):
to act unethically or even unlawfully.4 But, in the good name of
the profession, we must endeavor to reduce that underclass of
wrongdoers to an absolute minimum. Legal gamesmanship must
be made as nearly impossible as the best human minds can make
it. Before I discuss how the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
propose to accomplish this, let me set out the matters which I
will address in this paper:
1. The professional responsibility context in which the
legal profession operates in comparison with ethical
standards of other professions.
2. The self-regulatory nature of professional responsibility
standards in the law.
3. The origins and objectives of the ABA Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards (commonly referred
to as the Kutak Commission after its chairman, Omaha
lawyer, Robert J. Kutak), and
4. Selected topics from the Kutak Commission's Proposed




c. Conflicts of interest.
d. Confidentiality.
The fundamental ethical clash for lawyers is between loyalty
to client, required by the Code to be "zealous," and candor to the
court, said to be absolute. While there may appear to be no
intrinsically irreconcilable conflict between these two concepts,
inconsistency arises in their practical applications and harmonization
is vital to the total structure of ethical conduct that the Code seeks
to advance.
I mention this issue of values-in-conflict first, perhaps out of
logical order, because it is the topic of most lively debate and
seeming disagreement between the proposed Model Roles of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules) and the present Code. The
assertion - erroneous, I believe - is that the proposed Model Rules
would drastically alter the role of the lawyer and weaken, if not
destroy, the adversary system. I reject both contentions.
LEGAL PROFESSION 5 (1980); Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral
Issues, 5 HUMAN REL. 1 (1975).
4. See J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 2, at 35-40.
[VOL. 26: p. 1137'1138
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICAL STANDARDS
IN THE PROFESSION
However useful the Golden Rule, the Ten Commandments,
and various strictures of other religions may be in shaping
standards of individual morality, those statements and the exegesis
built around them do not offer much guidance to doctors, lawyers,
accountants, and other professionals in resolving the ethical problems
that regularly confront them. Despite present recognition of the
inadequacy of allowing each individual to resolve such issues
without direction from the profession, the notion of group
responsibility to identify and provide guidance as to proper conduct
was slow in coming. The majestic Hippocratic oath answers few
if any real-world problems, but for almost the entire history of
medicine, physicians received little help beyond those few words of
moral truism.
The legal profession, which has been widely criticized by Plato,
Jesus, Shakespeare, and many modern commentators, lacked even
the modest comfort of the Hippocratic oath until the latter half
of the nineteenth century; 5 and specifics came much more slowly.6
In retrospect, the laggard development of ethical standards for
lawyers is somewhat surprising. Lawyers even more than other
professionals confront genuinely difficult choices between two or
more competing claims on their professional responsibility. The
lawyer's primary obligation to the client, including the requirement
to maintain client confidence, not infrequently raises difficult
questions as to how the lawyer, who serves as an officer of the court,
can satisfy the equally important obligation of candor to the
tribunal. While the physician and other health professionals accept
a similar primary obligation of loyalty to patients, satisfaction of
that obligation does not often lead to a conflict with ethical
obligations to other individuals or institutions.
Perhaps the reality is that even lawyers who were aware of
potential and actual conflicts were not very sensitive to these and
other ethical concerns. The legal profession in nineteenth century
United States was a rough-and-tumble activity in which too many
lawyers willingly served client interests, illegal as well as legal, in
ways not inconsistent with then-prevailing standards of business
morality.
5. Preface, 1969 Final Draft ABA Code of Professional Responsibility,
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The first reported effort to identify and suggest answers to
some of the ethical dilemmas of the legal profession was in the
lectures of Judge George Sharswood of Alabama in 1854. 7 Subse-
quent movement was not exactly swift. Judge Sharswood's ethical
principles were adopted as the Alabama Code of Ethics in 1887,s
and they later formed the basis for the Canons of Ethics promul-
gated by the American Bar Association. 9 All of these, including
the thirty-seven Canons of the ABA, were preachy in tone and,
while a great improvement over the preceding absence of any
regulation or guidance, they did not deal with many of the hard
questions.
The Code of Professional Responsibility, approved by the ABA
House of Delegates in 1969,10 was the first serious attempt to deal
with the ethical dilemmas of the legal profession. As recommended
to the states for consideration in their respective decision-making
processes, the Code consisted of three parts: 1) Nine Canons,"
couched in such non-specific advice as this: "A lawyer should assist
in maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal profes-
sion," 12 or this: "A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of
impropriety." 1' 2) Ethical Considerations (EC's) in supplement
to each Canon, aspirational in tone, intended to lead over time to
improved ethical practices.' 4 3) Disciplinary Rules (DR's), intended
to require or forbid specified conduct. The DR's are thus the
basis for discipline against lawyers who fail to meet those stand-
ards.' 5 The great bulk of all lawyer discipline has occurred since
7. Id. See also J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 2, at 54-55.
8. Id.
9.. id.
10. Preface, ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY i (1979) [herein-
after cited as ABA CODE].
11. Preamble and Preliminary Statement, ABA CODE, supra note 10, at 1.
The Code explains that:
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in
general terms the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers
in their relationships with the public, with the legal system, and with
the legal profession. They embody the general concepts from which
the Ethical Considerations and the Disciplinary Rules are derived.
Id.
12. ABA CODE, supra note 10, Canon 1.
13. Id., Canon 9.
14. Preamble and Preliminary Statement, ABA CODE, supra note 10, at 1.
15. Id.
[VOL. 26: p. 11371140
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1969 in reliance on these much more specific rules than anything
that had gone before.1"
Although the Code of Professional Responsibility was a signifi-
cant advance toward the identification and resolution of ethical
problems faced by lawyers, it did not deal with all the issues; 11 it
is already outdated by subsequent developments; 18 and differing
versions 19 and conflicting interpretations have robbed it of the
originally hoped for uniformity of standards for lawyer conduct.20
The period during which the Code was drafted, 1965 through
1969, was a time of considerable ferment on the American legal
and social scenes. New issues were being raised about traditional
methods of law practice, including controversy regarding setting
restrictions on group legal services, establishing minimum fee
schedules to be enforced by lawyer discipline, allowing lawyer
advertising and client solicitation, and the possibility of requiring
lawyers to report client wrongdoing. More activity and change
occurred in the area of professional responsibility during the decade
of the 1970s than in the entire previous century.
By the mid-1970s, despite the fact that the Code was less than
a decade old, many lawyers concluded that substantial modification
was essential. In 1977, the late William B. Spann, Jr., then Presi-
16. For a discussion of recent statistics regarding lawyer discipline and an
analysis of possible conclusions which may be drawn, see Steele & Nimmer,
Lawyers, Clients, and Professional Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION
RESEARCH J. 919 (1976).
17. For example, the current Code focuses primarily on the lawyer in the
courtroom context. It provides little guidance for the problems faced by the
lawyer in the office, and so does not accurately reflect modern legal practice.
Patterson, Wanted: A New Code of Professional Responsibility, 63 A.B.A.J.
639 (1977). Questions relating to representation of clients with differing inter-
ests, the financing of litigation, and the duty to act competently are also dealt
with insufficiently. Sutton, How Vulnerable is the Code of Professional
Responsibility?, 57 N.C.L. REv. 497, 498 (1979).
18. Rules dealing with client solicitation, advertising, and trial publicity
have required revision to accommodate court decisions and the changing legal
practice. See Sutton, supra note 17, at 498.
19. Responding to the Supreme Court's decision in Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350 (1977), the ABA promulgated a new rule governing lawyer advertis-
ing, but proposed two versions of the rule. Alternative A set forth a regulatory
approach to lawyer advertising, specifying various permissible methods of
publicizing the availability of legal services, and allowing individuals to come
before the appropriate agency for approval of other means of disseminating
information. Alternative B is more general, taking a directive approach.
A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 141 (1979 Supp.). For
the text of Proposal A and Proposal B, see 46 U.S.L.W. No. 9 (Aug. 23, 1977)
(Statutes).
20. Hazard, Proposed Revision of the Rules of Legal Ethics in the United
States. Paper presented at the 1980 ABA National Meeting, Sydney, Australia,
August 11-16, 1980, 237, 241-43 (copy on file, Villanova Law Library). See also
Hazard, Rules of Legal Ethics: The Drafting Task, 36 Tim REcom 77 (1981).
11411980-81]
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dent of the American Bar Association, appointed the Commission
on Evaluation of Professional Standards to review the Code of
Professional Responsibility and to make recommendations for
revision.
21
Although the Commission originally conceived its function in
terms of revision by way of amendment, it soon became clear that
the defects of the Code were in part structural. Since all rules
were grouped under only nine subject-matter headings, which were
not themselves clearly distinguishable one from another, the
physical placement of rules together under the Canons was neces-
sarily somewhat arbitrary. As a result, it is not easy to find all
items of possibly relevant guidance on any particular topic. More-
over, many questions are answered ambiguously or not at all.
Equally troublesome is the fact that the Code focuses somewhat
disproportionately on problems that arise in the litigation context.
The issues addressed therefore are those that relate to the trial
process, which represents only a small fraction of the typical legal
practice. Little guidance is provided for the more numerous office-
practice problems that are of principal concern to most lawyers.
Most important of all is the fact that the tripartite division
among Canons, Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules has
not worked well. It should be recalled that the EC's were devised
to clarify and resolve ambiguities in the 1908 Canons concern-
ing which rules were enforceable by disciplinary action and
which were not. It was a useful idea. In the evolution of the
law of professional conduct, the Code was a valuable intermedi-
ate step. But the Code has not overcome the problem it was
intended to solve, nor has it provided uniform standards through-
out the nation. Six states - California, Illinois, Kansas, Massa-
chusetts, New Mexico and Oklahoma -adopted the Code without
Ethical Considerations. 22  In seven states-Georgia, Iowa, Louisi-
ana, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont and Virginia - the Code's
Ethical Considerations can be considered obligatory along with the
21. See Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM. B.
FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 953, 955. Members of the Commission were as
follows: Robert j. Kutak, Chairman, Omaha, Neb.; Arno H. Denecke, Salem,
Or.; Thomas Ehlrlich, Washington, D.C.; Jane Lakes Frank-Harman, Washing-
ton, D.C.; Marvin E. Frankel, New York, N.Y.; Lois C. Harrison, Lakeland,
Florida; Robert 0. Hetlage, St. Louis, Mo.; Robert B. McKay, New York, N.Y.;
Robert W. Meserve, Boston, Mass.; L. Clair Nelson, Washington, D.C.; Richard
H. Sinkfield, Atlanta, Ga.; William B. Spann, Jr., Atlanta, Ga. (1979-81); Samuel
D. Thurman, Salt Lake City, Utah; Alan Barth, Washington, D.C. (1978-79).
22. Kutak, Evaluating the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
1980 AM. B. FOUNDATION REsEARCH J. 1016, 1018 & n.5 and cases cited therein.
As to California, see Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of Califor-
nia, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE foil. § 6076 (West Cum. Supp. 1981).
[VOL. 26: p. 11371142
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Disciplinary Rules.23 In those states, either by court ruling or the
court's refusal to adopt the distinction between DR's and EC's,
nothing is aspirational. Everything is enforceable. 24  In other
states there are numerous instances where courts have enforced the
presumably aspirational Ethical Considerations through censure,
suspension, or even disbarment.2
5
The difficulties thus created have been identified as follows by
Robert Kutak, chairman of the ABA Commission on Evaluation
of Professional Standards:
The problem with aspirational standards is that too
often they do not remain aspirational. They tend to be-
come enforceable rules. Frequently, lawyers have dis-
covered that the language of an EC is enforceable, not at
the time of their conduct, but within the context of dis-
ciplinary proceedings in which they are charged with
violation of the Code.26
In view of the substantial uncertainty of interpretation and
the increasing lack of uniformity among the states, the Commission
concluded that the time had come for development of a new
format.27 The proposed structure builds in more conventional
fashion on a functional arrangement of the lawyer's professional
activities. The eight major subdivisions of the Proposed Model
Rules of Professional Conduct are designed to facilitate the search
for the applicable rule and to answer eight questions as directly
and simply as possible.28 The titles of the rules disclose their
content much more clearly than do the rather vaguely worded
nine Canons of the present Code, as the following comparison
aptly demonstrates.
23. Kutak, supra note 22, at 1017-18 & nn.3 & 4 and cases cited therein.
See also Schneyer, The Model Rules and Problems of Code Interpretation and
Enforcement, 1980 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 939, 943.
24. Kutak, A Progress Report on the Proposed Model Rules of Professional
Conduct 15 (unpublished remarks to the Cincinnati Bar Association, Nov. 6,
1980) (copy on file, Villanova Law Library).
25. Kutak, supra note 22, at 1017-18.
26. Kutak, supra note 23, at 1016.
27. See Kutak, Coming: The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
66 A.B.A.J. 47 (1980). See also Kutak, supra note 22, at 1018.
28. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, PROPOSED FINAL
DRAFT (May 30, 1981), Table of Contents, xi-xii [hereinafter cited as MODEL
RULES, 1981 FINAL DRAFT]. An earlier version of the Model Rules, the pro-
posed discussion draft, used a different organization and broke down the code
into ten subheadings. ABA MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, PROPOSED
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CANONS OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(Current Code)
Canon 1. A Lawyer Should Assist in Maintaining the
Integrity and Competence of the Legal Pro-
fession.
Canon 2. A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession
in Fulfilling Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel
Available.
Canon 3. A Lawyer Should Assist in Preventing the
Unauthorized Practice of Law.
Canon 4. A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences
and Secrets of a Client.
Canon 5. A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Pro-
fessional Judgment on Behalf of a Client.
Canon 6. A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Com-
petently.
Canon 7. A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zeal-
ously Within the Bounds of the Law.
Canon 8. A Lawyer Should Assist in Improving the
Legal System.
Canon 9. A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance
of Impropriety.
29
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1981 PROPOSED








1.6 Confidentiality of Information
1.7 Conflict of Interest: General Rule
1.8 Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions
1.9 Conflict of Interest: Former Client
1.10 Imputed Disqualification: General Rule
1.11 Successive Government and Private Employment
1.12 Former Judge or Arbitrator
1.13 Organization as the Client
1.14 Client under a Disability
1.15 Safekeeping Property
1.16 Declining or Terminating Representation
29. ABA CODE, supra note 10, Canons 1-9.
[VOL. 26: p. 11371144
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2.3 Evaluation for Use by Third Persons
Advocate
3.1 Meritorious Claims and Contentions
3.2 Expediting Litigation
3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal
3.4 Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel
3.5 Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal
3.6 Trial Publicity
3.7 Lawyer as Witness
3.8 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor
3.9 Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings
Transactions With Persons Other Than Clients
4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others
4.2 Communication with Person Represented by Counsel
4.3 Dealing with Unrepresented Person
4.4 Respect for Rights of Third Persons
Law Firms and Associations
5.1 Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer
5.2 Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer
5.3 Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants
5.4 Professional Independence of a Firm
Public Service
6.1 Pro Bono Publico Service
6.2 Accepting Appointments
6.3 Membership in Legal Services Organization
6.4 Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests
Information About Legal Service
7.1 Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services
7.2 Advertising
7.3 Personal Contact with Prospective Clients
7.4 Communication of Fields of Practice
7.5 Firm Names and Letterheads
Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession
8.1 Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters
8.2 Judicial and Legal Officials
8.3 Reporting Professional Misconduct
8.4 Misconduct
8.5 Jurisdiction 30
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Comparison of the structure of the current Code and the pro-
posed Final Draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
demonstrates not only the improved logic of the arrangement, but
also the departure from the hortatory nature of the Canons
which leave considerable ambiguity as to the extent of the profes-
sional obligation. The proposed Final Draft of the Model Rules
overcomes that difficulty by abandoning the aspirational language
of the Canons and Ethical Considerations, substituting instead the
black-letter format familiar to lawyers in specifying that which is
required, that which is forbidden, and that which is discretionary.
Consonant with this Restatement format, each Rule is followed by
a Comment that explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose
of the Rule. These Comments and the Preamble, which provides
general orientation concerning a lawyer's responsibilities, are, like
legislative history, intended to aid in construction of the Rules.
In addition, there are Notes to each Rule with explicit comparison
of the proposed Rule to provisions of the present Code, and ex-
tensive Legal Background discussion of the sources of each Rule."1
The Model Rules were developed over a period of nearly four
years, from August 1977 to May 1981.32 In January 1980, a Dis-
cussion Draft [Model Rules, 1980 Discussion Draft] was made
available to the profession, intended to elicit comment and sug-
gestions for improvement in working toward final recommenda-
tions.38 Comment there certainly was, mostly of a critical nature.
The sharpest complaints went to three aspects of the Discussion
Draft.
First, a number of bar associations and individual lawyers
objected to the new format which they feared would create un-
necessary confusion because of its departure from the structure of
a Code scarcely more than a decade old. 4  The Commission's
answer, as already noted, was that the present Code, contrary to
the hopes of its drafters, has not promoted unity of professional
responsibility rules, is inflexible, difficult to use, and not responsive
31. The Notes, comparisons, and Legal Backgrounds represent changes
included in the 1981 Final Draft and were not part of the 1980 Discussion
Draft.
32. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
33. See Preface to the Discussion Draft, MODEL RULES, 1980 Discussion
DRAFT, supra note 28, at i-ii.
54. See NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF BAR COUNSEL, REPORT ON A STUDY OF
THE PROPOSED ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITH RECOM-
MENDATIONS (1980); Zerfoss, Revision not Rejection is the Way to Modernize
the Code of Professional Responsibility, 26 VILL. L. REv. 1177 (1981).
114 6 [VOL. 26: p. 1137
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to present, let alone future, needs of the profession and the public
it serves.
In order to address the concern with change of format, the
Commission issued on May 30, 1981, along with its revision of the
proposed Model Rules, a revised version of the present Code, con-
taining all the substantive changes made by the proposed Model
Rules and eliminating all provisions inconsistent with the recom-
mended version, but working these modifications into the current
Code's format. The profession will thus be able to judge which
version makes the greater functional sense. The Commission be-
lieves that, if the substantive changes are acceptable, the revised
format will sell itself.
Second, the January, 1980 Discussion Draft provision for man-
datory pro bono publico service by lawyers 85 drew perhaps the
strongest attacks.83 While conceding that lawyers should assure rep-
resentation to those who cannot pay for legal assistance and should
assist in law reform and other public service activities related to
the law, few lawyers were willing to accept a mandatory obliga-
tion. The Commission has been persuaded (with some dissents)
that the overwhelming sentiment of the bar should be respected.T
The May 30, 1981 version reads as follows:
Pro Bono Publico Service
A lawyer should render public interest legal service.
A lawyer may discharge this responsibility by providing
professional services at no fee or at a reduced fee to per-
sons of limited means or to public service or charitable
groups or organizations, or by service in activities for im-
proving the law, the legal system or the legal profession."8
Notably, this is the only place in the proposed Model Rules
where the operative verb is "should." Elsewhere, the controlling
language is "shall," "shall not," or "may."
Third, the provisions in the January 1980 Discussion Draft
relating to confidentiality of client communications drew substan-
tial fire from the organized bar and from individual lawyers.3 9
35. MODEL RULES, 1980 DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 28, RULE 8.1.
36. See Slonim, Kutak Panel Report: No Mandatory Pro Bono, 67 A.B.A.J.
33 (1981); Slonim, Commission Votes Down Pro Bono Reporting, 66 A.B.A.J.
951 (1980).
37. Id.
38. MODEL RULES, 1981 FINAL DRAFT, supra note 28, RULE 6.1.
39. Redlich, Disclosure Provisions of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 1980 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 981.
11471980-81]
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Interestingly, much of the criticism was directed at provisions which
were taken directly from the present Code as interpreted by the
courts:40 Many lawyers, made aware for the first time of provisions
in the present Code, concluded that they were unhappy with the
already rather extensive exceptions to the requirement of confi-
dentiality. Publication of the 1980 Discussion Draft served its
purpose well. Differences have been aired, explanations have been
advanced, and language has been modified to clarify intention and
to meet Well-grounded objections. The subject of confidentiality,
as a major theme in the Proposed Model Rules, is further discussed
below.
While the May 30, 1981 draft is identified as the "Proposed
Final Draft: American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct," even that is almost certainly not the absolutely final
version. In the fall of 1981 hearings will be held before a specially
designated ABA Commission, which will then report its views to
the ABA Board of Governors.4 1 After the Kutak Commission is
given a final opportunity for any revisions it cares to make in light
of those comments, the final version will be presented formally to
the American Bar Association for debate and vote, at the midwinter
or annual meeting in 1982.42
III. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE PROPOSED MODEL RULES:
THE FOUR "C's"
Every part of the Proposed Model Rules is intended to provide
guidance to lawyers in particular aspects of professional responsi-
bility. Accordingly, no Rule is unimportant. Nevertheless, some
aspects of the Rules deserve special attention because of recurring
questions and the difficulty of resolving competing claims. There
are, for example, a number of problems that arise in connection
with the not infrequent conflicts between the duty of loyalty to the
client and the obligation of candor to the court.43 There are also
difficult tactical questions about how much disclosure to opposing
parties is appropriate and how to draw the fine line between
frivolous claims or defenses and legitimate strategies of representa-
40. See notes 80-82 and accompanying text infra.
41. Slonim, Kutak Commission After More Time, 66 A.B.A.J. 1350 (1980).
42. Id. See also Letter from Robert Kutak to Members of the ABA,
Dec. 5, 1980 (on file, Villanova Law Library).
43. See A. KAuFMAN, supra note 26, at 111-88 (1976), 61-104 (1979 Supp.);
Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 Micm. L. REV. 1469 (1966).
1148 [VOL. 26: p. 1137
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tion."4 As in the case of day fading into night, it is hard to say
precisely where the line is drawn at dusk; but at high noon there
is no problem of definition. It is the aim of the proposed Model
Rules to shed the light of day on as many of the seeming im-
ponderables as possible, while identifying quite explicitly those
areas of dusk or dawn when the lawyer must shape an answer in
regard to circumstances that cannot be fully specified in black-
letter text.
Four areas of particular difficulty in the determination of pro-
fessionally responsible conduct are here selected for further in-
quiry. They are the four "C's" of competence, cost, conflicts of
interest, and confidentiality. I shall discuss them in that order.
A. Competence
Everyone talks about lawyer competence;"5 but sometimes it
seems not much is being done about it. Although judges often
complain about incompetent performance by lawyers, they seldom
report those failures to the disciplinary authorities, or even to the
lawyers themselves.'0 Similarly, while lawyers vigorously criticize
to each other the conduct, performance, and ethical abuses of other
lawyers, they seldom report those deficiencies and ethical breaches
to the relevant disciplinary authorities, despite the provision in the
Code that requires a lawyer to report violation of a Disciplinary
Rules to the appropriate authority.47 Only clients seem inclined
to report lawyer incompetence, but such complaints most often
charge delay, failure to communicate adequately or involve disputes
over fees. Clients are, in fact, not ordinarily in a very good posi-
tion to judge lawyer competence. They are more likely to make
judgments about competence in terms of results favorable or un-
favorable to their own cause, which is by no means the best basis
for such judgment.
44. Thurman, Limits to the Adversary System: Interests That Outweigh
Confidentiality, 5 J. OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 5, 16-19 (1980).
45. See Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1
(1973); Burger, Some Further Reflections on the Problem of Adequacy of Trial
Counsel, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1980); Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy:
Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to our
System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227 (1973); Kaufman, The Court Needs
a Friend in Court, 60 A.B.A.J. 175 (1974); McKay, Competence and the Pro-
fessionally Responsible Lawyer, 31 EMORY L.J. 1 (1981).
46. Maddi, Trial Advocacy Competence: The Judicial Perspective, 1978
AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 105, 144. See also Frankel, Curing Lawyers'
Incompetence: Primum Non Nocere, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 613, 617 (1977).
47. ABA CODE, supra note 10, DR 1-103(A).
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There are, to be fair, good reasons for lawyer failure to report
the incompetence of other lawyers. The present Code offers little
guidance. Canon Six merely asserts that "A Lawyer Should Rep-
resent a Client Competently." 48 The relevant Ethical Considera-
tions do not help much 4 9 and the only applicable Disciplinary
Rule says only this:
(A) A lawyer shall not
(1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or
should know that he is not competent to handle,
without associating with him a lawyer who is
competent to handle it.
(2) Handle a legal matter without preparation
adequate in the circumstances.
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. 0
The short of it is that there is nowhere a definition of com-
petence, which is treated as though the term were self-defining.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
The May 30, 1981 Proposed Final Draft of the Model Rules
acknowledges the importance of the matter by placing the subject
of competence as the first item addressed:
Competence
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a
client. Competence requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness, preparation and efficiency reasonably neces-
sary for the representation.51
The proposed Rule is an improvement over the present Code
in its clear statement that competent representation is mandatory
and that failure to meet the defined standard is a matter for disci-
pline. While this definition more fully particularizes the ele-
ments of competence than the present Code, Rule 1.1 does not
provide a standard of comparison for judging competence. Is the
standard the level of competence of the typical general practi-
tioner, or is it the level of the practitioner who specializes in the
particular matter? And what comprises the community of gen-
eralists or specialists against whose performance the standard of
48. Id., CANON 1.
49. Id., EC 6-1 through EC 6-6.
50. Id., DR 6-101, Failing to Act Competently.
51. MODEL RULEs, 1981 PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 28, RULE 1.1.
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competence is to be judged? The accompanying Comment and
Legal Background notes provide guidance for answering these and
related questions.
Despite the modesty of the Model Rule's attempt to provide
further definition of this most basic obligation of every lawyer,
complaints have been raised that the proposed language favors the
specialist and casts the general practitioner into some kind of outer
darkness. It is hard to read that result into these seemingly in-
nocuous words. It is to be hoped that the proposed standard has
real bite in moving toward truly competent representation of
clients, which should be the goal of every lawyer, and must be the
goal of the organized profession.
B. Cost
Judge Irving Kaufman, Chief Judge Emeritus of the Second
Circuit, has described cost and delay as the "twin devils" of the
legal profession.52  Corporate and individual clients complain in-
creasingly about the cost of legal representation." The American
Bar Association, recognizing the seriousness of the problem, has
established an Action Commission to Reduce Court Costs and
Delay.54 Manifestly, it is the lawyer's professional obligation to
keep fees within reasonable limits and to avoid unnecessary delay.
As always, however, there is difficulty in ascertaining what fees are
"reasonable" and what delay is "unnecessary." Understandably,
the present Code does not definitively answer these questions,"5 nor
do the proposed Model Rules. The useful achievement of the
Model Rules is that the lawyer obligation is stated in mandatory
52. Kaufman, Judicial Reform in the Next Century, 29 STAN. L. REv.
1 (1976).
53. Ralph Nader, who generated at least his share of work for lawyers in
the name of public interest litigation, this year mounted a conference to seek
ways of reducing legal fees. See A Corporate Campaign to Slash Legal Costs,
BUSINESS WEEK 90 (May 25, 1981).
54. Janofsky, A.B.A. Attacks Delay and the High Cost of Litigation, 65
A.B.A.J. 1323 (1979). See also Hufstedler & Nejelski, A.B.A. Action Commission
Challenges Litigation Cost and Delay, 66 A.B.A.J. 965 (1980).
55. ABA CODE, supra note 10, Canons 6-7 and accompanying Ethical
Considerations and Disciplinary Rules. DR 6-101(A)(3) requires that a lawyer
not "[n]eglect a matter entrusted to him." EC 6-4 states that a lawyer should
"give appropriate attention to his legal work." CANON 7 states that "A
LAWYER SHOULD REPRESENT A CLIENT ZEALOUSLY WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF LAW."
DR 7-101(A)(1) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not intentionally . . . fail to
seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means
permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules .... ." DR 7-101(A)(3) provides
that "[a] lawyer shall not intentionally . ; . prejudice or damage his client
during the course of the relationship ....
11511980-81]
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form, in simple declaratory sentences, along with helpful Com-
ment and Legal Background. The provisions relevant to cost and
delay are:
Rule 1.3 (Diligence), which requires a lawyer to "act with
reasonable promptness and diligence in representing a client."
Rule 1.4 (Communication), which deals with what is prob-
ably the most common complaint against lawyers - failure to in-
form clients about legal strategy and progress on the subject matter
of the representation. There is no direct counterpart to this pro-
vision in the present Code; it is brand new, and is a useful addition.
The rule requires a lawyer to "keep a client reasonably informed
about a matter by periodically advising the client of its status and
progress and by complying with reasonable requests for informa-
tion." 5 It also requires a lawyer to "explain the material legal and
practical aspects of a matter and reasonable alternative courses of
action to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to
make informed decisions regarding the representation." 11
Rule 1.5 (Fees) deals directly with the question of cost, an
issue of primary concern to clients. Problems have typically arisen
because of misunderstandings about fees and the basis for cal-
culating charges. The rule proposes to mandate a written fee
agreement in most circumstances, stating:
(b) The basis or rate of a lawyer's fee shall be communi-
cated to the client in writing before the lawyer renders
substantial services in a matter, except when:
(1) An agreement as to the fee is implied by the fact
that the lawyer's services are of the same general kind
as previously rendered to and paid for by the client;
or
(2) The services are rendered in an emergency or
where a writing is otherwise impractical.58
The Proposed Model Rules continue authorization of the
contingent fee, but specify with some particularity the various ele-
ments to be included in or excluded from calculation of the fee.
Referral fees have also caused considerable client misunder-
standing and resentment. But they do serve a useful purpose in
reducing the risk that a lawyer will seek to handle alone a matter
56. MODEL RuLEs, 1981 FINAL DRAFT, supra note 28.
57. Id., Rule 1.4(b).
58. Id., Rule 1.5(b).
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beyond the lawyer's effective capacity. To protect against the pos-
sibility of abuse and to prevent the charging of fees above the
reasonable value of the services rendered, the proposed rule pro-
vides as follows:
(d) A division of fee between lawyers who are not in the
same firm may be made only if:
(1) The division is in proportion to the services per-
formed by each lawyer, or by written agreement with
the client all. lawyers assume responsibility for the
representation;
(2) The client consents to the participation of all the
lawyers involved; and
(3) The total fee is reasonable.59
Protection against frivolous proceedings and unreasonable de-
lays is provided by the proposed Model Rules in several places.
For example, under the heading "Meritorious Claims and Con-
tentions," the Model Rules provide:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert
or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a reasonable
basis for doing so, which includes a good faith argument
for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.
A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or
the respondent in a proceeding that could result in in-
carceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding
as to require that every element of the case be established.6 0
As a corollary to this negative injunction, the next provision,
titled "Expediting Litigation," imposes an affirmative duty on the
lawyer to "make reasonable effort consistent with the legitimate
interests of the client to expedite litigation.6 '
59. Id., Rule 1.5(d).
60. Id., Rule 3.1.
61. Id., Rule 3.2. See also Rule 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and
Counsel) which prohibits unlawful obstruction of access to evidence (Rule
5.4(a)); forbids, in pretrial procedure, making "a discovery request that has no
reasonable basis, or [failing] to make reasonably diligent effort to comply
with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party" (Rule 3.4(d)):
and forbids, during trial, allusion to "any matter that the lawyer does not
reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible
evidence .... ." (Rule 3.4(e)).
Finally, Rule 4.4 (Respect for Rights of Third Persons) provides that "a
lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to
embarrass, delay, or burden a third person .. ."
11531980-81]
17
McKay: In Support of the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1981
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
C. Conflicts of Interest
An essential ingredient of professional responsibility standards
for lawyers is an effective statement defining conflicts of interest
and sanctioning violations. The present Code contains provisions
to that effect, but they are scattered and somewhat inconclusive.
62
Benefiting from experience with the Code, it is now possible to
clarify and improve the conflict of interest rules. Model Rule 1.7
consolidates the provisions found in Canon Five of the present
Code into a single standard that applies whether the source of
possible conflict exists because of the personal interest of the lawyer,
or because of a commitment made by the lawyer to another client
or to any other third party. Rule 1.7 goes beyond the current
Code's DR 5-105(A) in requiring that, when the lawyer's interest
is involved, not only must the client consent after disclosure, but
also that, independent of consent, the representation must reason-
ably appear to be compatible with the best interests of the client.63
As noted above, Model Rule 1.7 states the general conflict of
interest rule. Rules 1.8 through 1.12 deal with the standards ap-
plicable to particular situations. The essence of those Rules may
be summarized as follows: Most of Rule 1.8 is as straightforward
and clear as words permit.64  Only one provision requires further
62. See e.g., ABA CODE, supra note 10, DR 5-101 through 5-107; DR 8-101;
DR 9-101.
63. MODEL RuLEs, 1981 FINAL DRAFT, supra note 28, RuLE 1.7. The text
of the rule follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the lawyer's ability to
consider, recommend, or carry out a course of action on behalf of
the client will be adversely affected by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests.
(b) When a lawyer's own interests or other responsibilities might
adversely affect the representation of a client, the lawyer shall not
represent the client unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the other responsibilities
or interests involved will not adversely affect the best interest of
the client; and
(2) The client consents after disclosure. When representation
of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the dis-
closure shall include explanation of the implications of the
common representation and the advantages and risks involved.
Id.
64. The text of Rule 1.8, Conflicts of Interest: Prohibited Transactions
provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business, financial, or property
transaction with a client unless the transaction is fair and equitable
to the client.
1154 [VOL. 26: p. 1137
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explanation. Rule 1.8(e) seeks to resolve the much-discussed ques-
tion of the extent to which lawyers may make cash advances to
clients in connection with pending or contemplated litigation. The
resolution conforms to actual practice, for which there is consider-
able justification, allowing a lawyer to advance court costs, ex-
penses of litigation and medical and living expenses, all contingent
on the outcome of the matter. (In the case of indigents the lawyer
may pay court costs and expenses of litigation without expectation
(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a
client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after
disclosure.
(c) A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a
member of the lawyer's family any gift from a client, including a
testamentary gift, except where the client is a relative of the donee.
(d) Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall
not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or
media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on
information relating to the relationship.
(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in
connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:
(1) A lawyer may advance court costs, expenses of litigation,
and reasonable and necessary medical and living expenses, the
repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the
matter; and
(2) A lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court
costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.
(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client
from one other than the client unless the client consents after
disclosure.
(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate
in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the
clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty
pleas, unless each client consents after disclosure, including disclosure
of the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and
of the participation of each person in the settlement.
(h) A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:
(1) A partnership or employment agreement that restricts
the right of a lawyer to practice law after termination of the
relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon
retirement; or
(2) An agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right
to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy between
private parties.
(i) A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the
lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless the client' is
independently represented in making the agreement, or settle a claim
for such liability unless the client is first advised that independent
representation may be appropriate in connection therewith.
(6) A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, child, sibling or
spouse may represent a client having an interest adverse to a person
represented by the other lawyer only upon consent by the client
after disclosure of the relationship.
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of repayment out of recovery.) In earlier times such advances,
unaccompanied by promises of repayment (however unrealistic),
would have been forbidden as one or more of that terrible trio-
barratry, champerty, and maintenance. But the modern realities
of the contingent fee, public interest litigation, and representation
of indigents on a non-fee basis all suggest the desirability of modi-
fying the rule to conform to the realities of litigation.
Model Rule 1.9, titled "Conflict of Interest: Former Client"
provides a new rule to deal with an old problem nowhere spe-
cifically resolved in the present Code. The sensible resolution is
the following:
A lawyer who has represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter:
(a) Represent another person in the same or a sub-
stantially related matter if the interest of that person
is adverse in any material respect to the interest of
the former client unless the former client consents
upon disclosure; or
(b) Use information relating to the representation to
the disadvantage of the former client unless the former
client consents after disclosure or the information has
become generally known.
65
Model Rule 1.10 seeks to answer questions about the extent
to which a lawyer's disqualification can be imputed to other mem-
bers of the firm with which the lawyer is associated. The current
Code sets forth a general rule of imputed disqualification of the
entire firm.66 But that does not answer all the questions; the
Model Rules now provide those answers.6 7
65. MODEL RULES, 1981 PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 28, RULE 1.9.
66. ABA CODE, supra note 10, DR 5-105(D).
67. MODEL RULES, 1981 PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 28, RULE 1.10
Imputed Disqualification; General Rule
(a) When lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall under-
take or continue representation when a lawyer practicing alone would
be prohibited from doing so under the provisions regarding conflict
of interest stated in Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 2.2.
(b) When lawyers terminate an association in a firm, none of them,
nor any other lawyer with whom any of them subsequently become
associated, shall undertake or continue representation that involves
a material risk of revealing information relating to representation of
a client in violation of Rule 1.6, or of making use of information to
the disadvantage of a former client in violation of Rule 1.9.
(c) Subject to the limitations of Rule 1.7, a disqualification prescribed
by this rule may be waived by the consent of the affected client after
disclosure.
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Another area of continued concern is addressed by Model
Rule 1.11 which deals with the sensitive issue of the revolving
door between public and private employment. Under the Model
Rules, the crucial test, whether the earlier employment was public
or private, is whether "the lawyer participated personally and
substantially" in the matter at issue.68 In the case of public-to-
private employment, the relevant government agency may waive
the disqualification. 9 Absent such a waiver, other members of
the firm may avoid imputed disqualification if "the disqualified
lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is
apportioned no part of the fee therefrom." 70
Model Rule 1.12 generally parallels Rule 1.11 in foreclosing
an adjudicative officer, arbitrator or law clerk from further partici-
pation in any matter in which the lawyer "has participated per-
sonally and substantially . . . unless all parties to the proceeding
consent after disclosure." 71
68. Id., RuLE 1. 11.
69. Id., RuLE 1.11(a).
70. Id., RuLE 1.11. The text of the rule provides:
(a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer shall not
represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the
lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or
employee, unless the appropriate government agency consents after
disclosure.
(b) A lawyer serving as a public officer or employee shall not:
(1) Participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated
personally and substantially while in private practice or non-
governmental employment, unless under applicable law no one
is, or by lawful delegation may be, authorized to act in the
lawyer's stead in the matter; or
(2) Negotiate for private employment with any person who
is involved as a party or as attorney for a party in a matter in
which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially.
(c) If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in a firm
with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue
representation in the matter unless:
(1) The disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation
in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
(2) Written notice is promptly given to the appropriate
government agency to enable the agency to ascertain compliance
with the provisions of the rule.
Id.
71. Id., RuLE 1.12(a). The full text of the rule provides:
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer shall not represent
anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated
personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer,
arbitrator or law clerk to such a person, unless all parties to the
proceeding consent after disclosure.
(b) A lawyer shall not negotiate for private employment with any
person who is involved as a party or as attorney for 'a party in a
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Finally, the Rule concerning the lawyer as. intermediary 72
provides realistic answers to the question whether and when a lawyer
may represent two or more clients in the same matter. The com-
mon wisdom is that multiple representation is never permissible be-
cause of potentially divergent interests. But that concept is, unduly
restrictive. When two or more parties embark upon an amicable
and mutually advantageous relationship - or even when agreement
is reached to dissolve a marriage or a business relationship - it may
be unnecessary, unwise, even hurtful to introduce an adversary re-
lationship into the negotiations. Reductions in cost and delay may
also be achieved through the use of a lawyer as intermediary in an
appropriate case. With these considerations in mind, Rule 2.2
establishes conditions and limitations upon the intermediary rela-
tionship, setting them out as follows:
Intermediary
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if:
(1) The lawyer discloses to each client the impli-
cations of the common representation, including the
advantages and risks involved, and obtains each client's
consent to the common representation; and
(2) The lawyer reasonably believes that the mat-
ter can be resolved on terms compatible with the
clients' best interests, that each client will be able to
make adequately informed decisions in the matter,
and that there is little risk of material prejudice to
the interest of any of the clients if the contemplated
resolution is unsuccessful; and
(3) The lawyer reasonably believes that the com-
mon representation can be undertaken impartially and
matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substan-
tially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, arbitrator or law clerk
to such a person.
(c) If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in a firm
with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue repre-
sentation in the matter unless:
(1) The disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation
in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
(2) Written notice is promptly given to the tribunal to enable
it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.
(d) An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multi-member
arbitration panel is not prohibited from subsequently representing
that party.
Id.
72. Id., RULE 2.2.
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without improper effect on other responsibilities the
lawyer has to any of the clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall explain
fully to each client the decisions to be made and the con-
siderations relevant in making them, so that each client
can make adequately informed decisions.
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the
clients so requests, if the conditions stated in paragraph
(a) cannot be met or if in the light of subsequent events
the lawyer reasonably should know that a mutually ad-
vantageous resolution cannot be achieved. Upon with-
drawal, the lawyer shall not continue to represent any of
the clients unless doing so is clearly compatible with the
lawyer's responsibilities to the other client or clients. 7 3
D. Confidentiality
Easily the most controversial part of the present Code or the
Proposed Model Rules, the provisions relating to the confidentiality
of client communication have received extremely careful con-
sideration in preparation of the Proposed Model Rules. No lan-
guage could conceivably satisfy those at one extreme, who insist
that there be no exceptions to confidentiality, or those at the other
extreme who believe lawyers are too often abused by clients who
seek to use lawyers as the instruments of their own wrongdoing
under the cloak of silence compelled by the rules of confidentiality.
Two important rights require reconciliation if ethical standards
for the legal profession are to succeed. Loyalty to the client is
acknowledged as essential to the lawyer-client relationship in order
to insure that the client disclose to the lawyer all information
necessary for effective representation. But it is equally important
that the client not be given license to commit illegal or fraudulent
acts upon the advice of counsel as to how to accomplish such
wrongful results.
These questions raise fundamental issues regarding the ad-
versary system - a system that controls the practice of law in the
Anglo-American world, although not elsewhere. The adversary
process at its best serves well the interests of justice, premised as
it is on the assumption that all parties will be represented by
counsel who will provide competent and diligent representation.
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struction of past events as is possible under the limiting rules of
evidence and the restraints of constitutional doctrine. To make
the system work, it is as important that counsel observe the require-
ments of candor to the court as it is that counsel respect the obli-
gation of loyalty to the client.
Some would argue that a lawyer must serve the client first and
disregard the obligations to the court.7 4 This is justified, it is
argued, because the lawyer "should be an officer of the court only
in the sense of serving the court as a zealous, partisan advocate of
one side of the case before it." 75 Attractive though this theory
may be to some lawyers and some clients, the courts have never
accepted a second-rank position for themselves. The Nebraska
Supreme Court, for example, said this:
An attorney owes his first duty to the court. He as-
sumed his obligations to it before he ever had a client.
His oath requires him to be absolutely honest even though
his client's interests may seem to require a contrary course.
The lawyer cannot serve two masters; and the one [he
has] undertaken to serve primarily is the court."
The adversary system does not impose an unrealistic obliga-
tion on the lawyer to volunteer facts adverse to the lawyer's client
or to argue both sides of the law on an issue. The adversary sys-
tem is premised on forceful competition from which truth will
emerge; but there are limits on the competition. Few would dis-
agree with propositions advanced in the Proposed Model Rules
that require truthfulness in lawyer conduct. Thus, the Model
Rules provide that "[a] lawyer shall not counsel or assist a client in
conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is crimi-
nal or fraudulent, or in the preparation of a written instrument
containing terms the lawyer knows or reasonably should know are
legally prohibited . . . ." 77 Similarly, it is scarcely surprising to
find a rule providing that "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly offer
74. See Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the
Lawyer Client Relationship, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Freedman, supra
note 43.
75. RoscoE POUND - AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, THE AMERICAN
LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUct 7 (Public Discussion Draft, 1980),
76. In re Integration of the Nebraska Bar Ass'n., 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W.
265, 268 (1937). See also State v. Krutchen, 101 Ariz. 186, 417 P.2d 510
(1966); Colorado Bar Ass'n. v. McCann, 80 Colo. 220, 249 P. 1093 (1926).
77. MODEL RULES, 1981 PROPOSED FINAL DRAFr, supra note 28, RULE 1.2(d).
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evidence that the lawyer knows to be false." 78 Equally unsur-
prising is the requirement that "In the course of representing a
client a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact
or law to a third person . . . ." 79
Moreover, the general principle of maintaining in confidence
disclosures by clients in the course of representation is subject to a
number of exceptions in the current Code. For example, the Code
requires the disclosure of any fraud committed by a client in the
course of representation. 0 In addition, the Code permits the
lawyer to disclose a client's intent to commit any crime."' Ironi-
cally, these two sections together create the anomaly of mandating
disclosure of fraud and merely permitting disclosure of intent to
commit murder. The Code also permits the lawyer to reveal "con-
fidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fees or to
defend himself or his employees against an accusation of wrongful
conduct." 82
The Proposed Model Rules contract the mandatory and per-
missive disclosures present in the current Code in some respects,
while expanding both in other respects. The net result follows:
Model Rule 1.6(b) states the general prohibition against re-
vealing information relating to representation of a client, except as
permitted (not required) in the following circumstances:
A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent
the lawyer believes necessary:
(1) To serve the client's interests, unless it is informa-
tion the client has specifically requested not be disclosed;
(2) To prevent the client from committing a crimi-
nal or fraudulent act that the lawyer believes is likely to
result in death or substantial bodily harm, or substantial
injury to the financial interest or property of another;
(3) To rectify the consequences of a client's criminal
or fraudulent act in the commission of which the lawyer's
services had been used;
78. Id., RULE 3.3(a)(4).
79. Id., RuLE 4.11.
80. ABA CODE, supra note 10, DR 7-102(B). This provision has been
amended in. a minority of *states to except cases where the information is
protected as a "privileged communication"; but that adds new confusion, since
"privilege" applies only where the lawyer is under court order to disclose.
Accordingly, in a non-court context any client fraud must still be disclosed.
81. ABA CODE, supra note 10, DR 4-101(C)(3).
82. Id., DR 4-101(C)(4).
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(4) To establish a claim or defense on behalf of the
lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client,
or to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim
against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client
was involved; or
(5) To comply with the rules of professional conduct
or other law.83
It will be observed that Rule 1.6(b)(2) narrows the present excep-
tion in the reporting of an intent to commit a criminal or fraudu-
lent act. The only broadening of the exception appears in Rule
1.6(b)(3), which allows the lawyer to disclose confidences while it
still remains possible to rectify the criminal or fraudulent conduct
in which the client used the lawyer as the unsuspecting instrument
of wrongdoing. Both results seem fair in vindication of the
lawyer's own integrity.
Addressing the difficult question of an organization as the
client, the Proposed Model Rules are concerned primarily with defin-
ing the status of the lawyer who represents a corporation or other
organization. In the course of such representation, the lawyer may
discover unlawful conduct that might result in material injury to
the client-organization. In such a case, the rule outlines the steps
the lawyer must take to seek correction of the wrong, working
initially within the organization.84 If unsuccessful in that effort,
the rule permits, but does not require, the lawyer to "take further
remedial action that the lawyer reasonably believes to be in the
best interest of the organization," 85 but only if the lawyer reason-
ably believes that:
(1) The highest authority in the organization has
acted to further the personal or financial interests of mem-
bers of that authority which are in conflict with the in-
terests of the organization; and
(2) Revealing the information is necessary in the best
interest of the organization.8"
83. MODEL RULES, 1981 PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 28, RULE 1.6(b).
84. Id., RULE 1.13(b). The rule provides, essentially, for the lawyer to
work up through the organization to the highest authority in an attempt to
rectify the situation.
85. Id., RULE i1.13(c).
86. Id.
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IN SUPPORT OF THE PROPOSED RULES
Could a profession committed to serve the public interest do less?
Model Rule 3.3, entitled "Candor Toward the Tribunal," con-
tinues the provision of the current Code that requires the lawyer
to "disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling juris-
-diction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position
of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel . . . ." 87 As
previously noted, Rule 3.3(a)(4), forbids the offering of false
.evidence. The present Code is ambiguous as to the lawyer's obli-
gation upon discovering that he or she has unknowingly presented
.such evidence. That ambiguity is directly resolved in the proposed
rule with this language: "If a lawyer has offered material evidence
and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures." 88 Should a lawyer do less in the interest of
personal and professional integrity?
Under the heading "Truthfulness in Statements to Others,"
the Model Rules provide that "[i]n the course of representing a
client a lawyer shall not knowingly fail to disclose a fact to a third
person when in the circumstances failure to make the disclosure
is equivalent to making a material misrepresentation ... ." 89 That
provision may require disclosure of some client confidences, but is
it more than a logical extension of the conceded proposition that
a lawyer may not present false or fraudulent testimony?
The above-cited provisions are those that permit or require
disclosure of client confidences. Who is to say that they are ill-
advised or that clients would be likely to withhold relevant in-
formation from a lawyer because of provisions in the Proposed
Model Rules? What can be said is that lawyers may practice their
profession with a clear conscience if they are permitted to protect
against intended criminal or fraudulent acts that threaten substan-
tial injury, and if they are not required to remain silent when
clients seek to impute their own wrongs to their lawyers.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is too early to predict whether the Proposed Final Draft of
the Model Rules will be accepted, modified or rejected. What
can be said with confidence is that these rules ask the hard ques-
tions and provide reasoned answers, with thoughtful explanations.
87. Id., RULE 3.3(a)(3).
88. Id., RULE 3.3(a)(4).
89. Id., RULE 4.1(b)(1).
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The black-letter text and accompanying Comments and statements
of Legal Background offer a splendid teaching tool for law stu-
dents, lawyers, judges, and the general public.
The proposed Model Rules are, I am satisfied, impossible to
ignore.
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 6 [1981], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol26/iss6/3
